I have interests in many areas–including also global history of science and math, history of philosophy of science, philosophy of history, and metaphilosophy–but most of my current work falls into one of the following two categories. Within each sub-category I’ve listed my active projects; see my CV page for the standard sort-by-date list of publications.

History and Philosophy of the Exact Sciences

Scientific Axiomatization

My work on axiomatization is broadly concerned with the role of mathematics in scientific progress: that is, how can mathematical research advance our understanding of a scientific domain, whether through theory articulation or model building? In this way, my concern for axiomatization lies primarily in the context of discovery, extending to the context of justification only insofar as such justifications do, or are expected to, lead to subsequent developments within science.

• Hilbert-style axiomatic completion: On von Neumann and hidden variables in quantum mechanics. Published version. Preprint.
  • In this paper I provide a detailed history of von Neumann’s “No Hidden Variables” theorem, and I argue it is a demonstration that his axiomatization mathematically captures a salient feature of the statistical transformation theory (namely, that hidden variables are incompatible). I show that this reading of von Neumann’s theorem is obvious once one recalls several factors of his work. First, his axiomatization was what I call a Hilbert-style axiomatic completion; indeed, it developed from work initiated by Hilbert (and Nordheim). Second, it was responsive to specific mathematical and theoretical problems faced by Dirac and Jordan’s statistical transformation theory (then called ‘quantum mechanics’). Third, the axiomatization was completed across his 1927 papers and 1932 book when he identified the basic assumptions underwriting quantum mechanics, showed that these suffice for deriving the trace rule, and showed that the trace rule is incompatible with hidden variables. With this reading in mind, his claim that quantum mechanics was in “compelling logical contradiction with causality” appears as a straightforward consequence of his theorem. I conclude by reassessing the theorem’s broader historical and scientific significance.
• The Thermodynamic Context of Early Quantum Mechanical Interpretation
  • I will argue that axiomatization is especially beneficial when the same phenomena can be described by different theories. Using the example of thermodynamic phenomena, which are describable using quantum theory and classical statistical mechanics, I will show that axiomatization afforded von Neumann the strict control of assumptions necessary to compare and contrast the theories; further, this compare-and-contrast was responsible for eminently useful theoretical concepts (e.g., von Neumann entropy) and highlighted novel interpretive problems of quantum theory (e.g., that its fate is intertwined with statistical mechanics on the question of whether it’s “about” agent inference or “about” system dynamics). I suggest that history and philosophy of physics has misunderstood not only von Neumann but many early quantum interpreters by ignoring its relationship to thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics.
• How Haag-tied is QFT, really? Published Version. Preprint. With David Freeborn and Marian Gilton.
  • Haag’s theorem cries out for explanation and critical assessment: it sounds the alarm that something is (perhaps) not right in one of the standard way of constructing interacting fields to be used in generating predictions for scattering experiments. Viewpoints as to the precise nature of the problem, the appropriate solution, and subsequently-called-for developments in areas of physics, mathematics, and philosophy differ widely. In this paper, we develop and deploy a conceptual framework for critically assessing these disparate responses to Haag’s theorem. Doing so reveals the driving force of more general questions as to the nature and purpose of foundational work in physics.
• Haag as a How-To Theorem. Preprint. With David Freeborn and Marian Gilton.
  • Haag’s theorem is a classic no-go theorem. It rigorously demonstrates there is a logical problem with the interaction picture (IP), one of the most widely used modeling tools in quantum field theory (QFT). The significance of the theorem for the use of the IP in QFT has been the subject of long-running debate, focused around how “worried” we should be. In this paper, we argue for an alternative and opposite perspective on Haag’s theorem, rejecting the `worry’ framing in favor of emphasizing the no-go theorem’s implications for model development.

Logic and Mathematics in Science

This work broadly concerns the relationship between science and mathematics. I am especially interested in the “foundational” role that logic and mathematics do (should) play in scientific reasoning and progress.

• Why Should Identity Be Harmonious? Preprint. (Forthcoming in Review of Symbolic Logic.)
  • Logical inferentialists have expected identity to be susceptible of harmonious introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction. While Read and Klev have proposed rules they argue are harmonious, Griffiths and Ahmed have criticized these rules as insufficient for harmony. These critics moreover suggest that no harmonious rules are forthcoming. I argue that these critics are correct: the logical inferentialist should abandon hope for harmonious rules for identity. The paper analyzes the three major uses of identity in presumed-logical languages: variable coordination, definitional substitution, and co-reference. We show that identity qua variable coordination is not logical by providing a harmonious natural-deduction system that captures this use through the quantifiers. We then argue that identity qua definitional substitution or co-reference faces a dilemma: either its rules are harmonious but they obscure its actual use in inference, or its rules are not harmonious but they make its actual use in inference plain. I conclude that the inferentialist may have harmonious rules for identity only by disrespecting its inferential use.
• On Hilbert’s So-Called Instrumentalism (draft available)
  • I argue that the distinction David Hilbert’s method of ideal elements draws between “real” and “ideal” elements is ephemeral. I show that this better fits the method’s use in the 19th century, as well as the reactionary nature of Hilbert’s Program, than the usual instrumentalist interpretation.
• Hilbert’s Scientific Epistemology
  • This paper will describe David Hilbert’s view of mathematics as a service discipline to the sciences. I will show that his axiomatic method merely codifies his belief that true mathematical progress implies scientific progress. This paper relies on the first English translation of his “Natur und mathematische Erkennen” lectures, which I am currently executing.

Scientific Realism and Instrumentalism

The following papers constitute the beginnings of a book project tentatively titled The Scientific Realism Debates: Past and Futures. It will trace the origins of the contemporary realism debate(s) before cataloguing positions therein according to the consequences that their proponents envision for their adoption. The motivating questions for all of these papers are methodological: Who is supposed to benefit from positions in the debate or the debate itself? How? And most importantly, what kind of evidence should we demand in support of a given position?

• An Examination of Some Aspects of Howard Stein’s Work. Published version. Preprint. Note: I recommend the preprint because of formatting errors in the published version.
  • Some understand Stein’s “Yes, but…” as an entry in the realism—instrumentalism debate (RID) itself, albeit one dissatisfied with then-extant positions. In this paper, however, I argue the opposite: Stein’s conception of science and his approach to its history and philosophy actually preclude the RID. First, I characterize Stein as persistently attending to his own historical and philosophical methods. I then describe his conception of science as both a dialectic and an enterprise, and I draw from this conception several conclusions about the relations between science and its history and philosophy. Finally, I provide a reading of “Yes, but…” that follows from Stein’s conception of science. On this reading, the RID is either irrelevant to or wrong of science and, moreover, distracts from a legitimate inquiry. I conclude by interpreting Stein’s remark that there is “no difference that makes a difference’’ between a cogent and enlightened realism and a sophisticated instrumentalism.
• Belief-Centered and Outcome-Centered Debates about Scientific Realism
  • The paper will distinguish between two major kinds of debate happening under the auspices of the scientific realism debate. First is the usual debate whose audience is philosophers and which expects to determine whether science aims to give a literally true story of what the world is like and/or whether acceptance of a theory involves belief that it is true (e.g., Van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image). This debate often centers on the latter, and for this reason I call it belief-centered. But increasingly philosophers have dabbled rhetorically in a debate about what are the scientific consequences of attitudes toward a scientific theory, where the intended audience also includes scientific practitioners and policy-makers. P.K. Stanford, for example, has argued that one’s belief in a scientific theory will often prevent one from discovering so-called unconceived alternative theories which not only explain phenomena equally well but are eventually adopted instead. Some authors have considered the consequences of the debate outside of science, too, such as on science communication or the proliferation of misinformation. I call this debate outcome-centered for its emphasis on the practical consequences of the debate.
    
    The paper’s primary contribution will be an argument that these debates call for different methods. In particular, I will argue that a successful argument in the outcome-centered debate requires one to precisely characterize the outcome, choose appropriate operationalizations, identify relevant bases of evidence, and specify valid methods of inference. That is, arguments are held to the standards required to motivate intervention. For this reason, arguments given in the belief-centered debate do not immediately transfer to the outcome-centered debate. I will make this concrete by focusing on the significance of belief for scientific behaviors widely accepted as contributing to scientific progress. Drawing on the cognitive science literature on belief, as well as the link between attitudes and behavior, I will argue that the kind of explicit belief discussed by philosophers is neither necessary nor sufficient for as-if behavior. As a consequence, the outcome-centered debate cannot content itself with discussion of explicit belief.
• Do Unconceived Alternatives Justify Scientific Instrumentalism? (R&R, draft available)
  • This paper will give an example of how arguments from the belief-centered debate fail to transfer to the outcome-centered debate. The paper assesses the argument Stanford provides for adopting instrumentalism–i.e., that the existence of an unconceived theoretical alternative to a realist scientist’s theory is evidence that an instrumentalist scientist would discover more theoretical alternatives. I show his argument fails to meet the standards of the new debate in two ways. First, the operationalizations he provides are insufficiently precise to be fruitfully applied to historical cases in the way he later assumes. Second, I argue that his method of inference–demonstrating that there exist unconceived alternatives–is not a valid argument that his proposed intervention (scientific instrumentalism) would have effected discovery of these alternative theories. I conclude that the core problem is that the notion of unconceived alternative, which was originally developed for the belief-centered debate, cannot transfer to the outcome-centered debate: it undermines valid argumentation by failing to admit of empirically-tractable operationalizations.

Feminist Philosophy

Equity in Philosophy of Science

In addition to service work I’ve done aimed at improving diversity, equity, and inclusion in philosophy of science, I have started working on research projects that support these efforts.

• Gender and the time cost of peer review in philosophy of science. With Erin Hengel and Jingyi Wu.
  • Does gender influence how long a paper spends in peer review? This paper will attempt to replicate the analysis performed by D. Alexander, O. Gorelkina, E. Hengel, and R. Tol in “Gender and the time cost of peer review” (draft here). In the event that the results replicate, the paper will describe interventions aimed at mitigating the effects.
• Negative Experiences in Philosophy of Physics
  • Philosophy of physics is dominated by white men–even more so than philosophy at large. Anecdotally, this has led negative experiences for many would-be researchers from underrepresented groups. But how can such experiences be minimized? This empirical study will use qualitative and inclusive research methods to identify the problems and how those affected think they can be addressed.

Sexual Violence and Misinformation

The scope of this work has expanded dramatically over the past year as I picked up an old project–which has become “False Memories”–that I began while in graduate school. My original interest was in combating then-prevalent news stories such as this one in The Atlantic, which not-so-subtly implied that the false memory literature called into question most Title IX complaints of sexual assault. While I am still interested in this, my interests now include the methodology of false memory research–especially how experimental designs are informed by real-world phenomena–as well as its applications in policy making–especially concerning gender discrimination, as with Title IX or the provision like that struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Morrison (i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 13981). I also have related interests in modeling interdisciplinarity and misinformation, but I am not currently working on any projects.

• False Memories: The Newest Bait-and-Switch Technique for Justifying Rape Myths
  • This paper will describe a (faulty) pattern of argument commonly used to justify doubting survivors’ accounts. The traditional argument justified such doubt by (wrongly) claiming women lie. I will argue that the newest version of this argument, which relies on psychological research on false memories, fails for the same reason as the older argument: it embraces the myth that rape is always catastrophic (Tilton 2022) and systematically ignores any body of evidence that shows otherwise. (I presented an early version of this argument at CLMPST 2023. The abstract can be found here.)
• On the Persistence of Spontaneously-Generated False Memories
  • Can false memories be identified and corrected? At least for the misinformation task, false memories can be mitigated by administering a warning about the presence of misinformation (cf. Blank & Launay 2014). This empirical study would introduce a warning technique in the DRM task, where false memories are spontaneously generated by participants during a free recall task.